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ABSTRACT
Although black holes are objects of central importance across
many fields of physics, there is no agreed upon definition for
them, a fact that does not seem to be widely recognized. Physi-
cists in different fields conceive of and reason about them in radi-
cally different, and often conflicting, ways. All those ways, how-
ever, seem sound in the relevant contexts. After examining and
comparing many of the definitions used in practice, I consider the
problems that the lack of a universally accepted definition leads
to, and discuss whether one is in fact needed for progress in the
physics of black holes. I conclude that, within reasonable bounds,
the profusion of different definitions is in fact a virtue, making the
investigation of black holes possible and fruitful in all the many
†Published in Nature Astronomy 2019, doi:10.1038/s41550-018-0602-1 (free read-only
SharedIt link: https://rdcu.be/bfNpM; preprint: arXiv:1808.01507 [gr-qc]). An ear-
lier version of this paper was titled “What Is a Black Hole?”
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different kinds of problems about them that physicists consider,
although one must take care in trying to translate results between
fields.
The Question
What is a black hole? That may seem an odd question. Given the centrality
of black holes to theoretical work across many fields of physics today, how
can there be any uncertainty about it? Black holes (and their analogues) are
objects of theoretical study in almost everything from optics to solid-state to
superfluids to ordinary hydrodynamics and thermodynamics to high-energy
particle physics to astrophysics to cosmology to classical, semi-classical and
quantum gravity; and of course they are central subjects of observational work
in much of astronomy. That fact perhaps provides part of the answer about the
uncertainty: there is not so much uncertainty about a single, canonical answer,
but rather there are too many good possible answers to the question, not all
consistent with each other. That is what makes the question of interest. There
is likely no other physical system of fundamental importance about which so
many different answers are to be had for its definition, and so many reasons to
be both satisfied and dissatisfied with all of them. Beatrice Bonga, a theoreti-
cal physicist, summed up the situation admirably (personal communication):
“Your five word question is surprisingly difficult to answer . . . and I definitely
won’t be able to do that in five words.” (From hereon, when I quote someone
without giving a citation, it should be understood that the source is personal
communication.)
The question is not only interesting (and difficult) in its own right. It
is also important, both for practical reasons and for foundational ones. The
fact that there are so many potentially good answers to it, and seemingly lit-
tle recognition across the fields that each relies on its own peculiar definition
(or small set of definitions), leads to confusion in practice. Indeed, I first
began to think deeply about the question when I noticed, time and again,
disagreements between physicists about what to my mind should have been
basic points about black holes all would agree on. I subsequently traced the
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root of the disagreements to the fact that the physicists, generally from dif-
ferent fields (or even only different subfields within the same field, such as
different approaches to quantum field theory on curved spacetime), were im-
plicitly using their own definition of a black hole, which did not square easily
with that of the others in the conversation. Different communities in physics
simply talk past each other, with all the attendant difficulties when they try to
make fruitful contact with one another, whether it be for the purposes of ex-
ploratory theoretical work, of concrete observational work, or of foundational
investigations. (Ashtekar and Krishnan1 in a review of work on isolated hori-
zons give the only discussion I know in the literature on this exact issue, that
different fields of physics use different definitions and conceptions of a black
hole.)
The profusion of possible definitions raises problems that are especially
acute for foundational work. The ground-breaking work of Hawking2,3 con-
cluded that, when quantum effects are taken into account, black holes should
emit thermalized radiation like an ordinary blackbody. This appears to point
to a deep and hitherto unsuspected connection among our three most funda-
mental, deeply entrenched theories, general relativity, quantum field theory,
and thermodynamics. Indeed, black hole thermodynamics and results con-
cerning quantum fields in the presence of strong gravitational fields more gen-
erally are without a doubt the most widely accepted, most deeply trusted set
of conclusions in theoretical physics in which those theories work together
in seemingly fruitful harmony. This is especially remarkable when one re-
flects on the fact that we have absolutely no experimental or observational
evidence for any of it, nor hope of gaining empirical access any time soon to
the regimes where such effects may appreciably manifest themselves.
All is not as rosy, however, as that picture may paint it. Those results
come from taking two theories (general relativity and quantum field theory),
each of which is in manifest conceptual and physical tension with the other
in a variety of respects, and each of which is more or less well understood
and supported in its own physical regime radically separated from that of the
other, and attempting to combine them in novel ways guided by little more
than physical intuition (which differs radically from physicist to physicist)
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and then to extend that combination into regimes we have no hard empir-
ical knowledge of whatsoever. It is far from clear, however, among many
other issues, what it may mean to attribute thermodynamical properties to
black holes.4 The problem is made even more acute when one recognizes
that the attribution suffers of necessity the same ambiguity as does the idea
of a black hole itself. Attempts to confront such fundamental problems as
the Information-Loss Paradox5,6 are in the same boat. Since almost all hands
agree that black hole thermodynamics provides our best guide for clues to a
successful theory of quantum gravity, it would be useful to know what exactly
those clues are. Thus, it behooves us to try to get clear on what black holes
are.
I shall speak in this essay as though the task is to provide a definition, in
perhaps something like a logical sense, for black holes. In their daily practice,
I suspect most physicists do not think in those terms, having rather more or
less roughly delineated conceptions they rely on in their work, a picture of
what they mean by “black hole”. Nonetheless, for ease of exposition, I will
continue to speak of definitions.
The History
In the 1960s, our understanding of general relativity as a theory experienced a
revolution at the hands of Penrose, Hawking, Geroch, Israel, Carter and oth-
ers, with the development of novel techniques in differential topology and ge-
ometry to characterize the global structure of relativistic spacetimes in ways
not tied to the specifics of particular solutions and independent of the as-
sumption of high degrees of symmetry. This work in part originated with the
attempt to understand the formation of singularities and the development of
the causal structure of spacetime during the gravitational collapse of massive
bodies such as stars. It culminated in the classic definition of a black hole as
an event horizon (the boundary of what is visible from, and therefore what can
in principle escape to, “infinity”), the celebrated singularity theorems of Pen-
rose, Hawking, and Geroch, the No-Hair theorems of Israel, Carter and others,
Penrose’s postulation of the Cosmic Censorship Hypothesis, the demonstra-
tion that trapped surfaces (close cousins to event horizons) will form under
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generic conditions during gravitational collapse, and many other results in
classical general relativity that today ground and inform every aspect of our
understanding of relativistic spacetimes. (For those interested in the fascinat-
ing history of the attempts to understand black-hole solutions to the Einstein
field equation before the 1960s, see Earman7, Earman and Eisenstadt8, and
Eisenstadt9.)
Among the community of physicists steeped in classical general rela-
tivity, exemplified by the groups associated with John Wheeler at Princeton
and Dennis Sciama at Cambridge, this was heady stuff. According to active
participants of those groups at the time, no one in that community had the
least doubt about what black holes were and that they existed.
It was otherwise with astrophysics and more traditional cosmology in
the 1960s. There was controversy about whether or not to take seriously the
idea that black holes were relevant to real-world physics. For many, black
holes were just too weird—according to the relativists’ definition, a black
hole is a global object, requiring that one know the entire structure of space-
time to characterize it (more on this below), not a local object determinable
by local observations of phenomena of the sort that are the bread and butter
of astrophysics. In his classic text on general relativity and cosmology, Wein-
berg10, for instance, strongly suggests that black holes are not relevant to the
understanding of compact cosmological objects such as quasars, expresses
deep skepticism that real stars will collapse to within their Schwarzschild
radius even while citing Penrose on the formation of trapped surfaces, and
completely dismisses the idea that the interior of the event horizon of the
Schwarzschild black hole is relevant for understanding collapse at all.
One crucial point that astrophysicists and cosmologists of the time were
not in a position to recognize, however, because of their conception of black
holes as a spatially localized, compact object formed by collapse from which
nothing can escape, is that black holes are not associated only with tradi-
tional collapse phenomena. As Bob Geroch, a theoretical physicist known
for his work in classical general relativity, points out, if all the stars in the
Milky Way gradually aggregate towards the galactic center while keeping
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their proportionate distances from each other, they will all fall within their
joint Schwarzschild radius long before they are forced to collide. There is,
in other words, nothing necessarily unphysical or mysterious about the inte-
rior of an event horizon formed from the aggregation of matter. Reasoning
such as this based on their definition of a black hole as a spacetime region
encompassed by an event horizon confirmed the relativists in their faith in
the existence of black holes, confirmation buttressed by the conviction, based
on Penrose’s results about the formation of trapped surfaces during generic
collapse, that the extremity of self-gravitational forces in traditional collapse
would overwhelm any possible hydromagnetic or quantum effects resisting it.
This paints the picture with an extremely broad and crude brush, and
there were many astrophysicists and cosmologist who did not conform to it.
As early as 1964 Edwin Salpeter and Yakov Zel’dovicˆ had independently ar-
gued that supermassive black holes accreting gas at the centers of galaxies
may be responsible for the enormous amounts of energy emitted by quasars,
along with their large observed variability in luminosity. In the early 1970s,
Donald Lynden-Bell proposed that there is a supermassive black hole at the
center of the Milky Way. Zel’dovicˆ in Moscow and groups led by Lynden-
Bell and by Martin Rees in Cambridge (UK) at the same time independently
worked out detailed theoretical models for accretion around black holes for
quasars and x-ray binaries.
Based on observational work, astrophysicists knew that some massive,
compact object had to be at the center of a quasar, but there was still reticence
to fully embrace the idea that it was a black hole. Accretion onto a black
hole was at that point the widely accepted model, to be sure, but the seem-
ingly exotic nature of black holes left many astrophysicists with unease; there
was, however, no other plausible candidate known. With upper possible mass
limits on neutron stars worked out in the 1970s, and more and more observa-
tional evidence coming in through the 1980s that the objects at the center of
quasars had to be more massive than that, and compressed into an extremely
small volume, more and more doubters were won over as theoretical models
of no other kind of system could so well account for it all. (It is amusing to
note, however, that even well into the 1980s Bob Wald, a theoretical physicist
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at the University of Chicago, had to warn astrophysicists and cosmologists
visiting there against describing black holes as “exotic” in their talks, as that
would have led to the interruption of their talk for chastisement by Chan-
drasekhar.) Cygnus X-1 and other X-ray binaries also provided observational
evidence for black holes in the early 1970s. It is perhaps fair to say that the
community achieved something like unanimous agreement on the existence
and relevance of black holes only in the early 2000s, with the unequivocal
demonstration that SgrA∗, the center of the Milky Way, holds a supermassive
black hole, based on a decade of infrared observations by Reinhard Genzel,
Andreas Eckart, and Andrea Ghez11,12.
Possible Answers
In Confessions, Saint Augustine famously remarked, “Quid est ergo tempus?
Si nemo ex me quærat, scio; si quærenti explicare velim, nescio.” (“What
then is time? If no one asks me, I know what it is. If I wish to explain it
to someone who asks, I do not know.” Lib. IX, cap. 14.) As for time, so
for black holes. Most physicists, I believe, know what a black hole is, right
up until the moment you blindside them with the request for a definition. In
preparation for writing this essay, I did exactly that. I posed the question,
with no warning or context, to physicists both young and old, just starting out
and already eminent, theoretician and experimentalist, across a wide variety
of fields. The results were startling and eye-opening, not only for the variety
of answers I got but even more so for the puzzlement and deep thoughtfulness
the question occasioned.
I will discuss the possible definitions in detail shortly. Before diving in,
however, it will be useful to sketch the terrain in rough outline. In table 1,
I lay out the core concepts that workers in different fields tend to use when
thinking about black holes. The table, however, is only a rough guide. As we
can see from the quotes from physicists in different fields given in separate
boxes at the end of the essay, and from the more detailed discussion below,
not all physicists in a given field conform to the standard.
Most likely because of my training and the focus of most of my own
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Field Core Concepts
astrophysics
• compact object
• region of no escape
• engine for enormous power output
classical relativity
• causal boundary of the past of future
null infinity (event horizon)
• apparent horizon
• quasi-local horizon
mathematical relativity
• apparent horizon
• singularity
semi-classical gravity
• same as classical relativity
• thermodynamical system of maximal
entropy
quantum gravity
• particular excitation of quantum field
• ensemble or mixed state of maximal
entropy
• no good definition to be had
analogue gravity • region of no escape for finite time, or
for low energy modes
Table 1 – The core concepts common to different fields for characterizing
black holes.
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work in classical general relativity and semi-classical gravity, I naively ex-
pected almost everyone I asked at least to mention “the boundary of the causal
past of future null infinity”, the classic definition of the event horizon dating
back to the ground-breaking work of the mid-to-late 1960s, as laid down in the
canonical texts on general relativity by Hawking and Ellis13 and by Wald14.
In the event, many did not, and most of those who mentioned it did so at least
in part to draw attention to its problems. The definition tries to take the intu-
ition that a black hole is a “region of no escape” and make it precise. In order
for the idea of a region of no escape to be cogent, there must be another region
stuff possibly could escape to, so long as it never enters the trapping region.
The definition thus states in effect that a spacetime has a black hole if one can
divide the spacetime into two mutually exclusive, exhaustive regions of the
following kinds. The first, the exterior of the black hole, is characterized by
the fact that it is causally connected to a region one can think of as being “in-
finitely far away” from the interior of the spacetime; anything in that exterior
region can, in principle, escape to infinity. The second region, the interior of
the black hole, is characterized by the fact that once anything enters it, it must
remain there and cannot, not even in principle, escape to infinity, nor even
causally interact in any way with anything in the other region. The boundary
between these two regions is the event horizon.
This definition is global in a strong and straightforward sense: the idea
that nothing can escape the interior of a black hole once it enters makes im-
plicit reference to all future time—the thing can never escape no matter how
long it tries. Thus, in order to know the location of the event horizon in
spacetime, one must know the entire structure of the spacetime, from start to
finish, so to speak, and all the way out to infinity. As a consequence, no local
measurements one can make can ever determine the location of an event hori-
zon. That feature is already objectionable to many physicists on philosophical
grounds: one cannot operationalize an event horizon in any standard sense of
the term. Another disturbing property of the event horizon, arising from its
global nature, is that it is prescient. Where I locate the horizon today depends
on what I throw in it tomorrow—which future-directed possible paths of par-
ticles and light rays can escape to infinity starting today depends on where the
horizon will be tomorrow, and so that information must already be accounted
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for today. Physicists find this feature even more troubling.
The existence of [a classical event horizon] just doesn’t
seem to be a verifiable hypothesis.
– Sean Gryb, theoretical physicist
(shape dynamics, quantum cosmology)
For reasons such as those, some physicists define a black hole as a kind
of horizon whose characteristic properties may be relative to a particular set
of observers and their investigative purposes, similar to how “equilibrium” in
thermodynamics must be defined for a system with respect to some charac-
teristic time-scale picked out by the physics of the problem at hand. Other
physicists propose generalizing the classic definition in other ways that make
explicit reference to observers, so-called causal horizons.15 This allows one
to bring the concept of a black hole as a horizon into immediate contact with
other more general kinds of horizons that appear in general relativity, in order
to formulate and prove propositions of great scope about, say, their thermo-
dynamical properties. It is interesting to note that several of these other con-
ceptions of a horizon do not depend on a notion of infinity in the sense of a
place one can unambiguously escape to (null or spatial infinity), but they do
still make implicit reference to a future temporal infinity.
Such causal horizons are still global in nature, however, so, in attempt-
ing to assuage the general dissatisfaction with the global nature of the classic
definition, one possible strategy is to attempt to isolate some characteristic
feature of a global black hole that can be determined locally. One popu-
lar such feature is a so-called apparent horizon, a structure that generically
appears along with a classical event horizon, but whose existence and loca-
tion can seemingly be determined locally, and which can also be defined in
spacetimes in which an event horizon cannot, e.g., those that are bounded in
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space so there is no good notion of “escape to infinity”. An apparent hori-
zon is a two-dimensional surface (which we may for our purposes think of as
a sphere) such that, loosely speaking, all light rays emanating outward from
nearby points on its surface start out parallel to each other. This captures the
idea that “nothing, not even light, can escape” in a local fashion—outgoing
light wants to remain tangent to the surface. Note, however, that there is no
guarantee that something entering the region bounded by a suitable character-
ization of the future evolution of such a surface may not later be able to exit
from it.
Many characteristic properties of classical event horizons follow al-
ready from the idea of an apparent horizon, and it is easily generalized to
alternative theories of gravity (i.e., non-quantum gravitational theories that
differ from general relativity). Nonetheless, apparent horizons (and other such
“local” notions of a horizon, which I discuss briefly below) are not quite so
local as commonly held opinion assumes: to determine that a surface is an
apparent horizon, one still needs to determine that neighboring outgoing light
rays propagate parallel to each other all at once on the entire surface. No
observer could ever determine this in practice, though perhaps a large team
of perfectly synchronized observers could do it in principle. An even more
serious problem, however, is that apparent horizons are slice-dependent, i.e.,
whether one takes an apparent horizon to be present or not depends on how
one foliates spacetime by spacelike hypersurfaces—on how one locally splits
spacetime up into spatial and temporal parts. Many physicists are uncomfort-
able with grounding reasoning of a fundamental nature on objects or struc-
tures that are not invariantly defined with respect to the full 4-dimensional
spacetime geometry.
Mathematicians in general are also leery of the global nature of the clas-
sic definition. In recent decades, mathematical relativity has largely focused
on studying the initial-value problem of general relativity, attempting to char-
acterize solutions to the Einstein field equation viewed as a result of dynam-
ical evolution starting from initial data on 3-dimensional spacelike hypersur-
faces. This initial data determines spacetime structure locally in the domain of
evolution. Because the presence of apparent horizons can be determined lo-
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cally in a mathematically relevant sense, they often use this as the marker that
a black hole is present. Under a few seemingly benign assumptions, moreover,
the presence of an apparent horizon leads by the classic Penrose singularity
theorem16 to the existence of a singularity one expects to find inside a black
hole. Since the presence of a singularity can also be determined locally, it is
often included in the definition of a black hole for mathematicians.
The mathematicians’ conception does not, however, meet all their own
desiderata. First, the initial data is not truly local—one must in general spec-
ify conditions on it asymptotically, at “spatial infinity”, and it is difficult at
best to see why needing to know the structure of spacetime at “all of space
at a given moment of time” is epistemically superior to needing to know the
future structure of spacetime. Even worse, it does not suffice for an unambigu-
ous definition of a black hole. We have little understanding of the evolution
of generic initial data for the Einstein field equation. We know of no way in
general to determine whether a set of locally stipulated initial conditions will
eventuate in anything like a classical horizon or singularity, except by explic-
itly solving the equations, and that is almost never feasible in practice, outside
special cases of unrealistically high degrees of symmetry.
[The classic conception of a horizon] is probably a very
useless definition, because it assumes we can compute the
future of real black holes, and we cannot.
– Carlo Rovelli, theoretical physicist
(classical general relativity, loop quantum gravity,
cosmology, foundations of quantum mechanics)
Besides the apparent horizon, there are other quasi-local characteriza-
tions of black holes that do not have objectionable global features, such as dy-
namical trapping horizons17 and isolated horizons18. Several physicists and
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astrophysicists in their replies to me mention these, mainly to discuss their
virtues, but they are difficult to describe without resorting to technical ma-
chinery. One may usefully think of them as closed surfaces that have many
of the properties of apparent horizons, without necessarily being associated
with a classical event horizon. They have problems of their own, though, a
severe one being that they are slice-dependent in the same way as apparent
horizons. Also, perhaps even worse, they have a form of “clairvoyance”: they
are aware of and respond to changes in the geometry in spacetime regions that
they cannot be in causal contact with19. Indeed, they can encompass regions
whose entire causal past is flat. This should be at least as troubling as the
“prescience” of global event horizons.
The global and prescient nature of the classical event horizon never
bothered me. I see the classic definition as an elegant and powerful ide-
alization, nothing else, allowing us to approximate the spacetime structure
around a system that is for all intents and purposes isolated from the rest of
the universe in the sense that the gravitational (and other) effects of all other
systems are negligible—spacetime in our neighborhood is approximately flat
compared to regions around objects we attempt to study and think of as black
holes, and we are very, very far away from them. It is also an idealization that
allows us to prove theorems of great depth and scope, giving us unparalleled
insight into the conceptual structure of general relativity as a physical theory
(in so far as one trusts results based on the idealization to carry over to the real
world). This of course still leaves us with the task of characterizing what it
means for a region of spacetime to “act approximately like a black hole” in a
way that renders the idealization suitable for our purposes. Given the number
of features one may want to take as characteristic and try to hold on to, and
the fact that one will not be able to hold on to all of them (as discussed be-
low), this still leaves a great deal of freedom in fleshing out the idea of “acting
approximately like a black hole” as a fruitful conception, and that presumably
will again depend on the details of the investigations at hand and the purposes
of the physicists engaged in them.
Astrophysicists, in their applied work, tend to be sanguine about the
global nature of the classic definition. They are happy to avail themselves of
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the deep results about horizons that the classic definition allows us to prove
when, e.g., they try to determine what observable properties a region of space-
time may have that would allow us to conclude that what we are observing is
a black hole in their sense. They still use in their ordinary practice, nonethe-
less, a definition that is tractable for their purposes: a system of at least a
minimum mass, spatially small enough that relativistic effects cannot be ig-
nored. Neutron stars cannot have mass greater than about 3 solar masses, and
a star with greater mass will not be relativistic in the relevant sense. It more or
less follows from this, as other astrophysicists stress as a characteristic prop-
erty when defining a black hole, that it be a region of no escape in a sense
relevant to their work.
A black hole is a compact body of mass greater than 4 So-
lar masses—the physicists have shown us there is nothing
else it can be.
– Ramesh Narayan, astrophysicist
(active galactic nuclei, accretion disc flow)
None of this, however, distinguishes a black hole from a naked singu-
larity (i.e., a singularity not hidden behind an event horizon, ruled out by
Penrose’s Cosmic Censorship Conjecture20). Astrophysicists tend to respond
to this problem in two ways. First, they try to exclude the possibility of naked
singularities on other theoretical grounds; second, much work is currently
being done to try to work out properties of naked singularities that would
distinguish them observationally from black holes21. There are many other
fascinating methodological and epistemological problems with trying to as-
certain that what we observe astronomically conforms to these sorts of defi-
nitions,22,23 but it would take us too far afield to go into them here.
It is worth remarking that it is not only astrophysicists who share this
conception. Many theoretical physicists working in programs from high-
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energy particle physics to loop quantum gravity also champion definitions
that latch on to one facet or another of the standard astrophysics definition.
Gerard ’t Hooft, for instance, in his remarks quoted at the end of the essay,
emphasizes his conception of a black hole as a vacuum solution resulting from
total collapse, adding a subtle twist to the astrophysicist’s concrete picture
in which ordinary matter may be present (e.g., in an accretion disc), a twist
perhaps congenial to a particle physicist’s aims of investigating the transfor-
mations of the vacuum state of a quantum field in the vicinity of a horizon.
Others take over the astrophysicist’s picture wholesale, emphasizing that pre-
vious purely theoretical conceptions are no longer adequate for contemporary
work that would make contact with real observations, as Carlo Rovelli makes
clear in his remarks quoted at the end. Nonetheless, as well as the astrophysi-
cist’s picture may work in practice, it also faces serious conceptual problems.
Black holes simply are not anything like other kinds of astrophysical systems
that we study—they are not bits of stuff with well defined spatiotemporal
positions that interact with ordinary systems in a variety of ways other than
gravity.
In the semi-classical framework, one treats the spacetime geometry as
classical, with quantum fields propagating against it as their background. In
that picture, some of the concerns just discussed appear to be mitigated. Black
holes seem to acquire some of the most fundamental properties of ordinary
physical systems: they exhibit thermodynamical behavior. The presence of
Hawking radiation, a consequence of the semi-classical approach, allows us
to define a physical temperature for a black hole24. Semi-classical proofs of
the Generalized Second Law, moreover, justify the attribution of entropy to
a black hole proportional to its area25. In the standard semi-classical pic-
ture, moreover, most researchers hold that the classical characterizations of
black holes are unproblematic (or, at least, no more problematic than in the
strictly classical context). The geometry is classical, they reason, so we can
avail ourselves of all the tools we use to characterize black holes in the clas-
sical regime. Nonetheless, in so far as we do accept the semi-classical picture
of black holes evaporating as they emit Hawking radiation, we must give up
entirely on the idea of black holes as eternal, global objects, and use that ideal-
ization with care. The very presence of Hawking radiation itself, furthermore,
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independently of the role it may play in black hole evaporation, means that
we may also need to give up on the classical idea of black holes as perfect
absorbers, and all the many important consequences that property entails.
If we do accept the picture [of semi-classical gravity], then black
holes become for the first time now, in this context, true physical
systems—they have thermodynamical properties.
– Daniele Oriti, theoretical physicist
(semi-classical gravity, group-field theory quantum gravity)
That, however, is a claim it is delicate to make precise, exactly because
of the subtle interplay between the quantum effects of matter and the classi-
cal geometry. It is difficult to say with precision and clarity whether or not
Hawking radiation shows that the interior of a black hole cannot be wholly
isolated causally from its exterior. That ambiguity, however, calls into ques-
tion the very distinction between the interior and the exterior of a black hole
that the idea of an event horizon is supposed to explicate. I believe the idea
of a black hole in the semi-classical context is not so clear cut as almost all
physicists working in the field seem to think. Indeed, that black holes seem to
have a non-trivial thermodynamics pushes us towards the view that there is an
underlying dynamics of micro-degrees of freedom that is not and seemingly
cannot be captured in the semi-classical picture, perhaps undermining the very
framework that suggested it in the first place. In the same vein, it is well to
keep in mind that none of the results in the semi-classical domain about black
hole thermodynamics come from fundamental theory, but rather from a patch-
work of different methods based on different intuitions and principles. As I
mentioned already in the introduction, the semi-classical picture comes from
trying to combine in completely novel ways two theories that are in manifest
tension with each other, absent the guidance and constraint of experimental
or observational knowledge. I think it behooves us to show far more caution
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in accepting the results of semi-classical black hole thermodynamics than is
common in the field.
In other approaches with a semi-classical flavor, such as the conjectured
duality between gravitational physics in anti-de Sitter spacetime and confor-
mal field theories on its boundary (AdS-CFT)26, and many projects based
on holography more generally,27–29 it is difficult to define black holes at all
in any direct way. In such approaches, one posits that the classical gravita-
tional physics in an interior region of a spacetime is entirely captured by the
physics of a quantum field on the boundary of the region (the timelike bound-
ary at infinity in anti-de Sitter spacetime, e.g.). It is not easy to read off from
the boundary physics whether anything resembling a black hole in any of its
many guises (a horizon of a particular sort, for instance) resides in the interior.
There are attempts to do so, however, by isolating characteristic fea-
tures of the configuration and evolution of the quantum fields on the boundary
associated with black hole spacetimes in the interior. The holographic prin-
ciple would then suggest that one identify those field configurations having
maximal entropy as black holes. In a similar vein, some physicists working
in holography and string theory, such as Juan Maldacena (personal commu-
nication), suggest that one characteristic feature of black holes is that their
dynamical evolution is maximally chaotic, part and parcel of their purported
entropy-maximization properties30. Others, such as ’t Hooft (personal com-
munication), reject that idea, contending that the main gravitational effect that
governs how black holes behave is completely linear, and so they cannot serve
as information scramblers in the sense championed by many others in the
holography community. One physicist’s characteristic property is another’s
mistaken claim.
Even if one does accept any of the glosses available in holography, one
must face the fact that it is difficult to extract from the physics of the boundary
field anything about the physics of the interior of a classical event horizon, a
well known problem in these approaches. Any definition that cannot handle
the interior of a black hole, however, must have a demerit marked against it.
No known quantum effect, nor any other known or imagined physical process,
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can cause spacetime simply to stop evolving and vanish, as it were, once
matter crosses its Schwarzschild radius. Perhaps nothing inside a horizon can
communicate with the outside, but that does not mean it is not part of the
world. As such, the mettle of physics demands that we try to understand it.
In quantum gravity in general, most agree that the problems of defining
a black hole in a satisfactory manner become even more severe. There is,
for instance, in most programs of quantum gravity, nothing that corresponds
to an entire classical history on which to base something like the traditional
definition. Even trying to restrict oneself to quasi-local structures such as the
apparent horizon has manifest problems: in the quantum context, in order to
specify the geometry of such a surface, one in effect has to stipulate simul-
taneously values for the analogues of both the position and momentum of
the relevant micro-structure, a task that quantum mechanics strongly suggests
cannot be coherently performed.
Ideally the definition used in Quantum Gravity reduces
to the one in classical General Relativity in the limit ~
goes to zero. . . . But since no one agrees on what a good
theory of quantum gravity is (not even which principles
it should satisfy), I don’t think anyone agrees on what a
black hole is in quantum gravity.
– Beatrice Bonga, theoretical physicist
(gravitational radiation, quantum gravity
phenomenology)
One strategy for characterizing a black hole common to many ap-
proaches to quantum gravity is to ask, what particular kind of ensemble or
assembly of building blocks constructed from the fundamental degrees of
freedom “looks like” a black hole, when one attempts to impose on them in
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some principled way a spatiotemporal or geometrical “interpretation”? The
idea is to try to put together “parts” of the classical picture of a black hole one
by one—find properties of an underlying quantum ensemble that make the
resulting “geometry” look spherically symmetric, say, and make it amenable
to having a canonical area attributed to it, and so on, building up to the semi-
classical picture31. It is difficult to test the conjecture that this will corre-
spond to a classical black hole, however, in any known program of quantum
gravity, because it is difficult to reconstruct the causal structure of the “re-
sulting” classical geometry. A related strategy that suggests itself, inspired
by the holographic principle, is to put together a quantum ensemble that in
some sense is sharply peaked around a spherically symmetric geometry at the
semi-classical level, a geometry moreover that respects the quasi-local condi-
tions imposed by the classical picture of what a horizon should be. One then
attempts to compute the entropy, maximizes it, and finally declares that the
resulting ensemble is the definition of a black hole. The conjecture that this
corresponds to a classical black hole is, again, difficult to verify theoretically,
and of course impossible at the present time to test by experiment, and will
be so for the foreseeable future.
Finally, although stricitly speaking not work in gravitational physics, it
is of interest to look briefly at so-called analogue models of gravity32,33. The
explosion of work in that field centers on generalizations of the idea of a black
hole, in the guise of a horizon of an appropriate sort across a broad range of
non-gravitational types of physical systems. The kinds of horizon at issue
here will of necessity be generalizations in some sense of the kinds one finds
in relativity, since one does not have available here the full toolbox of clas-
sical spacetime geometry to work with. The fundamental problem is that the
horizons one deals with in analogue systems are never true one-way barriers.
This raises fascinating problems about how much or even whether at all one
should trust the results of experimental and theoretical work in that field to
translate into confirmatory support for the semi-classical gravity systems they
are analogue models of34,35. Sadly, space does not permit discussing those
problems here.
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Why It Matters
I believe there is a widespread hope across the many fields of physics in which
black holes are studied that, though the conceptions, pictures, and definitions
used differ in manifestly deep and broad ways, nonetheless they are all at bot-
tom trying to get at the same thing. It is difficult otherwise to see how work in
one area is to make fruitful contact with work in all the other areas. It is, how-
ever, at this point only a hope. Much work must be done to make clear exactly
how all those different definitions, characterizations, and conceptions relate to
each other, so we can have confidence when we attempt to apply results from
one field to problems in another. That is why the question matters.
Consider Hawking radiation. It is a problem oddly unremarked in the
literature that, in the semi-classical picture, Hawking radiation is not black-
body radiation in the normal sense. Blackbody radiation, such as the electro-
magnetic radiation emitted by a glowing lump of hot iron, is generated by the
dynamics of the micro-degrees of freedom of the system itself—in the case
of iron, the wiggling and jiggling of the iron’s own atoms and free electrons
that makes them radiate. That is not the mechanism by which Hawking ra-
diation is produced. In the semi-classical picture, Hawking radiation is not
generated by the dynamics of any micro-degrees of freedom of the black hole
itself, but rather by the behavior of an external quantum field in the vicinity
of the horizon. The hope, presumably, is that a satisfactory theory of quantum
gravity will be able to bring these two prima facie disparate phenomena—
the horizon on the one hand, and the dynamics of the external quantum field
on the other—into explicit and harmonious relation with each other so as to
demonstrate that the temperature of the thermalized quantum radiation is a
sound proxy for the temperature of the black hole itself as determined by the
dynamics of its very own micro-degrees of freedom. Since Hawking radi-
ation is universally viewed as the strongest evidence in favor of attributing
a temperature to black holes, and so attributing thermodynamical properties
more generally to them, the lack of such an explicit connection ought to be
troubling. It ought to become even more troubling when one considers the
difficulties of defining black holes in all the different relevant contexts, and
relating those different definitions in rigorous, clear, precise ways. How can
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the physicists across different fields hope to agree on an answer when they do
not even agree on the question?
You [Curiel] suggest that it should be troubling that black hole
temperature seems very different from the temperature of ordi-
nary matter. I find this very intriguing and exciting, not troubling.
– Bob Wald, theoretical physicist
(classical general relativity, quantum field theory on curved
spacetime)
I suspect there will never be a single definition of “black hole” that
will serve all investigative purposes in all fields of physics. I think the best
that can be done, rather, is, during the course of an investigation, to fix a
list of important, characteristic properties of and phenomena associated with
black holes required for one’s purposes in the context of interest, and then
to determine which of the known definitions imply the members of that list.
If no known definition implies one’s list, one either should try to construct
a new definition that does (and is satisfactory in other ways), or else one
should conclude that there is an internal inconsistency in one’s list, which
may already be of great interest to learn. Here are potentially characteristic
properties and phenomena some subset of which one may require or want:
• possesses a horizon that satisfies the four laws of black hole mechanics;
• possesses a locally determinable horizon;
• possesses a horizon that is, in a suitable sense, vacuum;
• is vacuum with a suitable set of symmetries;
• defines a region of no escape, in some suitable sense, for some mini-
mum period of time;
• defines a region of no escape for all time;
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• is embedded in an asymptotically flat spacetime;
• is embedded in a topologically simple spacetime;
• encompasses a singularity;
• satisfies the No-Hair Theorem;
• is the result of evolution from initial data satisfying an appropriate
Hadamard condition (stability of evolution);
• allows one to predict that final, stable states upon settling down to equi-
librium after a perturbation correspond, in some relevant sense, to the
classical stationary black hole solutions (Schwarzschild, Kerr, Reissner-
Nordström, Kerr-Newman);
• agrees with the classical stationary black hole solutions when evaluated
in those spacetimes;
• allows one to derive the existence of Hawking radiation from some set
of independent principles of interest;
• allows one to calculate in an appropriate limit, from some set of inde-
pendent principles of interest, an entropy that accords with the Beken-
stein entropy (i.e., is proportional to the area of a relevant horizon, with
corrections of the order of ~);
• possesses an entropy that is, in some relevant sense, maximal;
• has a lower-bound on possible mass;
• is relativistically compact.
This list is not meant to be exhaustive. There are many other such proper-
ties and phenomena one might need for one’s purposes. It is already clear
from this partial list, however, that no single definition can accommodate all
of them. It is also clear from the discussion that, even within the same com-
munities, different workers will choose different subsets of these properties
for different purposes in their thinking about black holes.
One may conclude that there simply is no common conceptual core to
the pre-theoretical idea of a black hole, that the hopeful conjecture that physi-
cists in different fields all refer to the same entity with their different defini-
tions has been thrown down on the floor and danced upon. I would not want
to draw that conclusion, though neither do I want to wholly endorse the strong
claim that there is a single entity behind all those multifarious conceptions. I
would rather say that there is a rough, nebulous concept of a black hole shared
across physics, that one can explicate that idea by articulating a more or less
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precise definition that captures in a clear way many important features of the
nebulous idea, and that this can be done in many different ways, each appro-
priate for different theoretical, observational, and foundational contexts. I do
not see this as a problem, but rather as a virtue. It is the very richness and
fruitfulness of the idea of a black hole that leads to this multiplicity of differ-
ent definitions, each of use in its own domain. I doubt the idea would be so
fruitful across so many fields if they all were forced to use a single, canonical
definition.
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Box 1: Astrophysical Views on Black Holes
A black hole is the ultimate prison: once you check in, you can
never get out.
– Avi Loeb, astrophysicist
(cosmology, black hole evolution, first stars)
For all intents and purposes we are at future null infinity with
respect to SgrA∗.
– Ramesh Narayan, astrophysicist
(active galactic nuclei, accretion disc flow)
[I]n practice we don’t really care whether an object is ‘precisely’
a black hole. It is enough to know that it acts approximately like a
black hole for some finite amount of time. . . . [This is] something
that we can observe and test.
– Don Marolf, theoretical physicist
(semi-classical gravity, string theory, holography)
[A black hole is] a region which cannot communicate with the
outside world for a long time (where ‘long time’ depends on what
I am interested in).
– Bill Unruh, theoretical physicist
(classical general relativity, quantum field theory on curved
spacetime, analogue gravity)
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Today ‘black hole’ means those objects we see in the sky, like for
example Sagittarius A∗.
– Carlo Rovelli, theoretical physicist
(classical general relativity, loop quantum gravity, cosmology,
foundations of quantum mechanics)
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Box 2: Classical Relativity and Semi-Classical Gravity Views on Black
Holes
I’d . . . define a causal horizon as the boundary of the past of an
infinite timelike curve [i.e., the past of the worldline of a potential
observer], and the black hole [for that observer] as the region
outside the past.
– Ted Jacobson, theoretical physicist
(classical general relativity, semi-classical gravity, entropic
gravity)
We [mathematicians] view a black hole to be a natural singularity
for the Einstein equation, a singularity shielded by a membrane[,
i.e., a horizon].
– Shing-Tung Yau, mathematician, mathematical physicist
(classical relativity, Yang-Mills theory, string theory)
A black hole is the solution of Einstein’s field equations for grav-
ity without matter, which you get after all matter that made up a
heavy object such as one or more stars, implodes due to its own
weight.
– Gerard ’t Hooft, theoretical physicist
(Standard Model, renormalizability, holography)
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I have no idea why there should be any controversy of any kind
about the definition of a black hole. There is a precise, clear def-
inition in the context of asymptotically flat spacetimes, [an event
horizon]. . . . I don’t see this as any different than what occurs ev-
erywhere else in physics, where one can give precise definitions
for idealized cases but these are not achievable/measurable in the
real world.
– Bob Wald, theoretical physicist
(classical general relativity, quantum field theory on curved
spacetime)
It is tempting but conceptually problematic to think of black holes
as objects in space, things that can move and be pushed around.
They are simply not quasi-localised lumps of any sort of ‘matter’
that occupies [spacetime] ‘points’.
– Domenico Giulini, theoretical physicist
(classical general relativity, canonical quantum gravity,
foundations of quantum mechanics)
One can try to define a black hole in the context of holography
and AdS-CFT as a macroscopic N -body solution to the quantum
field theory that evolves like a fluid on the boundary of spacetime,
which one can argue are the only solutions with horizons in the
interior.
– Paul Chesler, theoretical physicist
(numerical relativity, holography)
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In analog gravity things get more difficult, since the dispersion
relation could mean that low energy waves cannot get out [of the
horizon] while high energy ones can (or vice versa).
– Bill Unruh, theoretical physicist
(classical general relativity, quantum field theory on curved
spacetime, analogue gravity)
The versions of the description [of black holes] used tacitly or
explicitly in different areas of classical physics (e.g. astrophysics
and mathematical general relativity) differ in detail but are clearly
referring to the same entities.
– David Wallace, philosopher
(foundations of quantum mechanics, statistical mechanics,
cosmology)
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Box 3: Quantum Gravity Views on Black Holes
I would not define a black hole [in this way]: by its classical
central singularity. To me it is clear that that is an artefact of the
limitations of General Relativity, and including quantum effects
makes it disappear.
– Francesca Vidotto, theoretical physicist
(loop quantum gravity, quantum gravity phenomenology)
A primary motivation of my research on quasi-local horizons was
to find a way of describing black holes in a unified manner in var-
ious circumstances they arise in fundamental classical physics,
numerical relativity, relativistic astrophysics and quantum grav-
ity.
– Abhay Ashtekar, theoretical physicist
(classical general relativity, loop quantum gravity, cosmology)
Black holes are not clearly defined in string theory and hologra-
phy.
– Andy Strominger, theoretical physicist
(string theory, holography)
[T]he event horizon . . . is a spacetime concept, and spacetime
itself is a classical concept. From canonical gravity we learn that
the concept of spacetime corresponds to a particle trajectory in
mechanics. That is, after quantization the spacetime disappears
in quantum gravity as much as the particle trajectory disappears
in quantum mechanics.
– Claus Kiefer, theoretical physicist
(semi-classical gravity, canonical quantum gravity)
29
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to all the many physicists and philosophers who responded to
my questions with thoughtful enthusiasm—you are too many to name, but
you know who you are. This essay would have been much poorer with-
out the illumination of your discussions. I must, however, single out Ab-
hay Ashtekar, Beatrice Bonga, Paul Chesler, Bob Geroch, Domenico Giulini,
Gerard ’t Hooft, Ted Jacobson, Claus Kiefer, Avi Loeb, Juan Maldacena, Don
Marolf, Ramesh Narayan, Daniele Oriti, Carlo Rovelli, Karim Thébault, Bill
Unruh, Bob Wald, David Wallace, and Shing-Tung Yau for supererogatory
input and further discussion. I thank Bill Unruh and Bob Wald also for their
recollections of the attitude of relativists in the 1960s and 1970s to black
holes, as well as Avi Loeb and Ramesh Narayan for discussion about the re-
ception of the idea in the community of astrophysicists at the same time. I am
also grateful to Marios Karouzos, Associate Editor at Nature Astronomy, for
suggesting I write this piece.
Some of this work was completed at the Black Hole Initiative at Harvard Uni-
versity, which is funded through a grant from the John Templeton Foundation.
The rest was completed at the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy,
in part funded by a grant from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (CU
338/1-1).
References
1. Ashtekar, A. & Krishnan, B. Dynamical horizons and their properties.
Phys. Rev. D 68, 104030 (2003).
2. Hawking, S. Black hole explosions? Nature 248, 30–31 (1974).
3. Hawking, S. Particle creation by black holes. Commun. Math. Phys. 43,
199–220 (1975).
4. Curiel, E. Classical black holes are hot (2016). arXiv:1408.3691 [gr-qc].
5. Marolf, D. The black hole information problem: Past, present, and future.
Rep. Prog. Phys. 80, 092001 (2017).
30
6. Unruh, W. & Wald, R. Information loss. Rep. Prog. Phys. 80, 092002
(2017).
7. Earman, J. Bangs, Crunches, Whimpers and Shrieks: Singularities and
Acausalities in Relativistic Spacetimes (Oxford University Press, Oxford,
1995).
8. Earman, J. & Eisenstaedt, J. Einstein and singularities. Stud. Hist. Philos.
M. P. 30, 185–235 (1999).
9. Eisenstaedt, J. The early interpretation of the Schwarzschild solution.
In Howard, D. & Stachel, J. (eds.) Einstein and the History of General
Relativity, 213–233 (Birkhäuser, Boston, 1989). Proceedings of the First
International Conference on the History of General Relativity, North An-
dover, MA, 8–11 May 1986.
10. Weinberg, S. Gravitation and Cosmology: Principles and Applications
of the General Theory of Relativity (Wiley and Sons Press, New York,
1972).
11. Genzel, R., Eckart, A., Ott, T. & Eisenhauer, F. On the nature of the dark
mass in the centre of the Milky Way. Mon. Not.@ R.@ Astron.@ Soc.
291, 219–234 (1997).
12. Ghez, A., Morris, M., Becklin, E., Tanner, A. & Kremenek, T. The ac-
celerations of stars orbiting the Milky Way’s central black hole. Nature
407, 349–351 (2000).
13. Hawking, S. & Ellis, G. The Large Scale Structure of Space-Time (Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge, 1973).
14. Wald, R. General Relativity (University of Chicago Press, Chicago,
1984).
15. Jacobson, T. & Parentani, R. Horizon entropy. Found. Phys. 33, 323–348
(2003).
16. Penrose, R. Gravitational collapse and space-time singularities. Phys.
Rev. Lett. 14, 57–59 (1965).
31
17. Hayward, S. General laws of black hole dynamics. Phys. Rev. D 49,
6467–6474 (1994).
18. Ashtekar, A., Beetle, C. & Fairhurst, S. Isolated horizons: A generaliza-
tion of black hole mechanics. Class. Quant. Grav. 16, L1–L7 (1999).
19. Bengtsson, I. & Senovilla, J. The region with trapped surfaces in spher-
ical symmetry, its core, and their boundaries. Phys. Rev. D 83, 044012
(2011).
20. Penrose, R. Gravitational collapse: The role of general relativity. Rev.
Nuovo Cimento Numero Speziale 1, 257–276 (1969).
21. Narayan, R. & McClintock, J. Observational evidence for black holes
(2013). arXiv:1312.6698 [astro-ph.HE].
22. Collmar, W. et al. Panel discussion: The definitive proofs of the existence
of black holes. In Hehl, F., Kiefer, C. & Metzler, R. (eds.) Black Holes:
Theory and Observation, vol. 514 of Lecture Notes in Physics, chap. 22,
481–489 (Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1998).
23. Eckart, A. et al. The milky way’s supermassive black hole: How good a
case is it? Found. Phys. 47, 553–624 (2017).
24. Wald, R. Gravitation, thermodynamics and quantum theory. Class.
Quant. Grav. 16, A177–A190 (1999).
25. Wall, A. Ten proofs of the generalized second law. J. High Energy Phys.
JHEP06(2009), 021 (2009).
26. Maldacena, J. The large N limit of superconformal field theories and
supergravity. Adv. Theor. Math. Phys. 2, 231–252 (1998).
27. ’t Hooft, G. Dimensional reduction in quantum gravity (1993). arXiv:gr-
qc/9310026v1.
28. ’t Hooft, G. The holographic principle (2000). arXiv:gr-qc/0003004v2.
29. Bousso, R. The holographic principle for general backgrounds. Class.
Quant. Grav. 17, 997 (2006).
32
30. Maldacena, J., Shenker, S. & Stanford, D. A bound on chaos. J. High
Energy Phys. 2016, 106 (2016).
31. Oriti, D., Pranzetti, D. & Sindoni, L. Black holes as quantum gravity
condensates. Phys. Rev. D 97, 066017 (2018).
32. Unruh, W. Dumb holes: Analogues for black holes. Philos. T. R. Soc. A
366, 2905–2913 (2008).
33. Jacobson, T. Black holes and Hawking radiation in spacetime and its
analogues. In Faccio, D. et al. (eds.) Analogue Gravity Phenomenology:
Analogue Spacetimes and Horizons, from Theory to Experiment, no. 870
in Lecture Notes in Physics, 1–29 (Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 2013).
34. Unruh, W. & Schützhold, R. Universality of the Hawking effect. Phys.
Rev. D 71, 024028 (2005).
35. Dardashti, R., Thébault, K. & Winsberg, E. Confirmation via analogue
simulation: What dumb holes could tell us about gravity. Brit. J. Philos.
Sci. 68, 55–89 (2017).
33
